

Development of Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping, Maritime Security Concept in Real Life

Hasan Bora USLUER

Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Galatasaray Üniversitesi,
Denizcilik Meslek Yüksekokulu
hbusluer@gsu.edu.tr
<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8988-9288>

Makale Başvuru Tarihi:26.04.2022

Makale Yayın Tarihi :31.05.2022

Makale Türü : Araştırma Makalesi

ABSTRACT

Key Words:

Strategy of Maritime
Management,
NATO,
Maritime
Transportation,
NCAGS,
Piracy.

Freedom is the main principle of life. In this respect, the free and safe navigation in the maritime transportation sector with the ships, which are the fundamental component of marine life, is unavoidable. In recent years, experienced maritime terrorism and piracy events have harmed maritime transportation and shipping. Result of these situations, all the countries decided that each country needed the advice and support for maritime transportation in the risky areas and the harbors. The concept name is Naval Cooperation, and Guidance for Shipping was born in 2003 by NATO. The main principle of this organisation is being a good support source for the maritime transportation and the ships and being a center responsible for liaison with the maritime community, which consists of ship and company owners, agencies, and national and international authorities. This study tries to explain these operations' development and shows to current maritime security working flow for maritime transportation and the strategy of maritime transportation management.

Key Words: Strategy of Maritime Management, NATO, Maritime Transportation, NCAGS, Piracy.

Denizcilik İş Birliğinin Geliştirilmesi ve Denizcilik için Rehberlik, Gerçek Hayatta Deniz Güvenliği Konsepti

ÖZET

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Denizcilik
Yönetimi
Stratejisi,
NATO,
Deniz
Taşımacılığı,
DUİR,
Korsanlık.

Özgürlük hayatın temel ilkesidir. Bu açıdan deniz yaşamının temel bileşeni olan gemiler ile deniz taşımacılığı sektöründe serbest ve güvenli seyir kaçınılmazdır. Son yıllarda yaşanan deniz terörü ve korsanlık olayları deniz taşımacılığına ve denizciliğine zarar vermiştir. Bu durumların sonucunda tüm ülkeler, riskli bölgelerde ve limanlarda deniz taşımacılığı için her ülkenin tavsiye ve desteğe ihtiyacı olduğuna karar verdi. Konsept adı, Deniz Ulaştırması için İş birliği ve Rehberlik faaliyetleri 2003 yılında NATO tarafından doğmuştur. Bu organizasyonun ana ilkesi, deniz taşımacılığına ve gemilere iyi bir destek kaynağı olmak, gemi ve şirket sahipleri, acenteler, ulusal ve uluslararası otoritelerden oluşan denizcilik camiası ile irtibattan sorumlu bir merkez olmaktır. Bu çalışma, deniz taşımacılığı için mevcut deniz güvenliği iş akışını ve deniz taşımacılığı stratejik yönetimini bu operasyonların gelişimini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION FOR NAVAL COOPERATIONS AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING-NCAGS

As a result of the research on the geoid, which is the scientific name of the not very smooth form of the earth, it is reported that 70% is covered with water (Wurl et al. 2017: 2-3). It is known that 80% of the livable living area is the seaside coastal area (Andreas et.al. 2017: 8-9). More than 90% of world trade is realized through maritime transport, so the importance of maritime transport and its related sectors is evident (Mersin et al. 2019: 2073-2074).

There are three essential components in particular with maritime transportation;

- I. Ships,
- II. Ports and,
- III. Shipping lines.

Maritime transportation is not a means of transport between countries but also an exchange between cultures. Maritime transport, which carries a large amount of world trade, also has some risks of an attack. Especially in the world maritime transport geography, it is an important danger that the ships are tried to be stopped in violation of the freedom of navigation and the crew's life is in danger (Bueger, 2015:159-164). This situation, described as piracy and maritime terrorism, poses a threat to the security of international trade. Also, piracy and maritime terrorism have a relationship between them (Murphy, 2007: 1-4), (Bueger,2015:159-165). According to the NATO Maritime Security definition, a permanent state in which the right to navigation is protected in the marine environment, subject to national and international law, and citizens, ships, infrastructures, and resources are safe. Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping-NCAGS provides Cooperation, Guidance, Advice, and Assistance to merchant shipping and enhances the safety and security of merchant ships in the vicinity of military activities like counter-piracy or other military operations. Commercial shipping relies on the principle of freedom, movement on the high seas to conduct its day-to-day business. Maritime trade is a fundamental strategic interest to nations dependent on freedom of movement on the seas and their economic well-being. Military operations at sea will frequently involve or impact merchant shipping, and likewise, merchant shipping may affect military operations. In order to both reduce conflict of interest between military and merchant shipping and enhance safety and security at sea, NATO developed and implemented the concept of NCAGS. Guidance can be provided to participating merchant ships to help them understand the nature and extent of the risk in an area. The acceptance of guidance is voluntary and intended to allow merchant ships to determine their voyage. In times of increased tension and conflict, additional information may be requested. The commercial sensitivity of the information supplied by the merchant shipping community will be respected and protected. Format Alpha, a voyage/passage report, is an abbreviated form of a Ship Data Card and is the principal means by which merchant ship data is collected for use by NCAGS.

With this study, it is intended to explain the development of naval cooperation and guidance for shipping, maritime security concepts in real-life; Explain the geostrategic importance of global security of maritime transport, which is a natural part of maritime economic activities and Define maritime security threat issues and providing general information about maritime transportation and cooperation issues.

2. OVERVIEW OF MARITIME AND SHIPPING THREAT

In recent years, intelligence analysts, law enforcement staff, and policymakers have become increasingly concerned about the terrorist group's focus on their attacks on maritime and shipping. The council for security cooperation in the Asia Pacific working group had offered a vast definition for the maritime terrorism; the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas, and port towns or cities (Greenberg et al., 2006: 10). In the past, maritime terrorism and piracy didn't correspond well to terrorists' available opportunities, capabilities, or

intentions. Also, many terrorist groups have neither been located in the eligible coastal area nor possessed the necessary means to extend their physical reach beyond local areas. Operating at sea requires having mariner skills, Access to appropriate assault and transport vehicles, the ability to mount and sustain operations from a non-land-based environment, and familiarity with specific specialist capabilities. The hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in October 1985 marked one of the first actual terrorist acts recorded in modern maritime history (Halberstam,1988:269-310). Following that incident, the International Maritime Organization adopted resolution A.584(14) on Measures to prevent unlawful acts that threaten ships' safety and the security of their passengers and crews. Subsequently, in 1986, taking also accounts the request of the United Nations General Assembly to study the problem of terrorism onboard ships and make recommendations on appropriate measures, the Organization issued MSC/Circ.443 on Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews onboard ships.



Figure 1: Achille Lauro at the harbor after the hijacking. (Israeled, 2022)

In the wake of the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America, Assembly resolution A.924(22) (November 2001) called for a review of the existing international legal and technical measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts against ships at sea and in port and to improve security aboard and ashore. The aim was to reduce risks to passengers, crews, and port personnel onboard ships and in port areas and to the vessels and their cargoes, enhance ship and port security, and prevent shipping from becoming a target of international terrorism. (Sixteenth OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum - Part 1: “Maritime and inland waterways co-operation in the OSCE area: Increasing security and protecting the environment” Vienna, 28- 29 January 2008).



Figure 2. September 11th, 2001 attack on World Trade Towers. (Takvim, 2001)

The maritime terrorism groups have already shown their capacity to operate on open seas successfully for other non-terrorism purposes which are especially piracy, illegal smuggling, and illegal human trafficking across the borders. Therefore, they may utilize their expertise in other forms of maritime crimes that have accumulated over the years to launch more damaging attacks on the global maritime system. Increased capability to respond

to each terrorist activity may prove to be very valuable and require cooperation between nations. (Bakır, 2007: 17-49)

2.1. Maritime Terrorism Overview

As mentioned in the previous section, maritime transport accounts for approximately 90% of the goods imported and exported in the global trade of nations. As well as the Seas, Oceans, natural or artificial waterways are also passed through for navigation safety and efficient use of time and transportation in a short time. While some of these waterways do not pose a risk of piracy or terrorism, such as the Turkish Straits, passages such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden are high-level risky (Çaycı, 2009: 9-12), (Xavier, 2004). Maritime Terrorists have freedom and chose chance in their choice of place, time, target, and method of attack. Except for some seaways like chokepoints, it is impossible to make predictions about the terrorist activities' exact place. During maritime transport, many weak sides of activities in the seas and oceans against terrorist activities encourage terrorists to take action at sea. The increase in supplies for nautical tourism and sports and the rise of specialized commercial enterprises have provided the terrorists with the necessary channel to access the resources and training they need to operate at sea. The fact that they can cause a global economic crisis by interrupting important ports and maritime trade lines, that is, the consequences of terrorist incidents will lead to great disasters. Terrorism at sea is a wide-ranging and coercive punishment for its victims. Especially cruise ships and passenger ferries are considered, as many passengers coexist in a small physical space. The global container shipping system provides terrorists with a method to facilitate the covert transfer of personnel and weapons.

2.2. Piracy Overview

The concepts of piracy at sea are complex. Although the term differs, it is confused with maritime terrorism. While piracy posed a direct threat primarily to the citizens of states, theft of ships and goods, and delayed mail on national or international waterways, piracy directly negatively impacts the economy and maritime trade (Richardson, 2004). During piracy in maritime transport, especially in the affected areas, if the meteorological and sea conditions are suitable for pirate boats who want to attack, large commercial vessels can be harassed and approached. (Rubin, A.P., 1998: 126–127) The aim here starts with the intention of taking money or stealing (Kleiman, 2004: 2-7). Small boats can neutralize the much larger boat and its more trained crew due to weapons and equipment not being available on commercial ships (Murphy, 2007: 22-45).

3. HISTORY OF NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

In the changing and developing global life, maritime transportation, which meets a great need, provides many benefits in its fields of activity while causing difficulties in many operational areas. Although there are solutions for these problems in ports and territorial waters by flag states or commissioned international organizations, they remain out of control in international waters, beyond the sphere of influence and jurisdiction of supervisory and regulatory authorities. In this statement, piracy and maritime terrorism activities have been experienced from past to present in uncontrolled regions. Although it may seem like regional and controllable events when it first started, maritime transport has begun to be affected due to developing technology and changing piracy perspectives. In order to prevent these illegal activities that start with the crew and then threaten the flag states of the cargo and ships carried, especially the organizations that work for their security and strategies have been involved. The International Maritime Organization-IMO, established in 1948 to regulate the maritime industry internationally, is the most important international institution that takes a comprehensive approach to Maritime Security. One of the five committees working on different issues within its own body is the Maritime Safety Committee. There is a Maritime Safety Working Group operating under the Committee (IMO,2022). The most accurate explanation in this statement will undoubtedly be NATO's maritime security efforts. The threat to merchant shipping has changed, and so has the Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) mission. The primary threat to merchant vessels is no longer considered traditional naval vessels under the flag of a known enemy; instead, the

threat is maritime terrorism. Different factors of type and intensity converge to establish a robust, effective, accurate, and real-time maritime security system. Although not interpreted within the concept of terrorism, Maritime Security is undoubtedly of great importance in international relations and related disciplines. (US, NWC, 2010). That will allow us to know what is happening within the global maritime domain and allow us to act promptly against potential threats, safeguard human life at sea, and provide safety and security to navigation and maritime trade. The first term was NCAPS, which also transformed into NCAGS at the time. The acronym of Naval Coordination and Protection of Shipping, NCAPS was working security of maritime transportation. The principle of NCAPS was escorting and leading maritime transportation convoys of merchant shipping during the Coldwar-era for open ocean threats like piracy and maritime terrorism. (NGA, 2022) Oceans and seas are largely unregulated areas and potentially environments that are especially vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Since the September 11th, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington (Klitzman et.al., 2003:400-406), military and civilian academic analysts have been investigating the possibility of an event of a similar magnitude taking place at sea, like an attack on the USS Cole in Yemen.



Figure 3: After the USS Cole attack, 2000 (VOA 2020, Maritimecyprus, 2016, Britannica, 2000).

From the beginning of the 2000s on the seas, naval attacks seemed small but meant a lot. The striking examples to be given are the main attack by Al-Qaeda on the AD warship USS Cole in the port of Aden. The explosive attack on MT Limburg in 2002 and the attack on the SuperFerry 14 passenger ferry in Manila in 2004 are other prominent examples (Murphy, 2007:7) The new term has started for Global Security after September 11th. In this term, power groups are intended to execute tactics and strategies which will cause asymmetric effects. Operation Sharp Guard, one of the most extensive campaigns under NATO, was conducted in the Adriatic Sea from 1992 to 1996 to conduct embargo operations and implement sanctions toward former Yugoslavia. During this operation, it is defined that 74 000 Merchant ships had been hailed, stopped, or diverted; however, no cooperation with civilian shipping had been made. It is also noticed that ship owners/operators had been suffering economic losses, and lots of negative feedback had been received by NATO. Due to this fact, NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) proposed some measures, and the BI-SC NATO Shipping Cooperation Policy, which is fundamental for NCAGS, was promulgated in 2000. Following these proceedings, Military Committee Policy Document MC 376, dated back to 1997 and still included Naval Control of Shipping, was updated as MC 376/1, defining Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping in 2003. Meanwhile, relevant Allied Tactical Publication ATP 2 (B) Volume 1 was promulgated and named NCAGS Manual in 2004. Nevertheless, it is noticed that the theme “Naval Supervision” from the cold-war era was still kept in the publication. In the light of lessons identified and lessons learned from NCAGS-themed NATO, Multi-national exercises, and real-world operations of Alliance such as Active Endeavour against global

terrorism, Operation Ocean Shield against piracy, and Operation Unified Protector against Libya, the NATO Shipping Working Group launched a comprehensive review of the doctrine. Subject Matter Experts worked on the publication to reflect real-world operation requirements. In the first step, the NCAGS concept was defined clearly, and in 2009, MC 376/2 was endorsed by NATO to synchronize the policy with the changes that have been made to ATP 2 (B) Volume 1. Lately, it has been noticed that the technics, tactics, and procedures (TTP) conducted in Operation Ocean Shield were mainly part of NCAGS activities, emphasizing flexibility, focusing on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), reflecting new tasks defined for navies, and introducing NCAGS effects. Within this context, ATP 2 Volume 1 Edition (C) Version (1) has been promulgated in August 2013, and MC 376/3 was approved by Military Committee in 2015.

NCAGS is defined as the provision of cooperation, guidance, advice, and assistance to merchant shipping in support of the commander's mission to enhance the safety and security of merchant ships. NCAGS can also provide the following principal benefits to merchant shipping when cooperating with the military;

- ❖ Enhanced safety and security,
- ❖ Reduced delays when transiting through military areas of operation,
- ❖ Continued operation of the commercial maritime transport system,
- ❖ Improved threat response,
- ❖ Enhanced understanding of military constraints,
- ❖ Potential for reduced war-risk premiums.

4. THREATS AND CHALLENGES AGAINST MERCHANT SHIPPING

It is evaluated that, unless more efficient new transport environments and energy sources are introduced, the importance of the seas will continue at least in the foreseeable future. Despite the importance of maritime transshipment, both natural events such as storms and human-induced hazards such as piracy and armed robbery at sea always form a threat.

Merchant ships are considered targets under the auspices of the following issues;

- ❖ Ship, cargo, and crew represent high values,
- ❖ Merchant ships comprise global Sea Lines of Communication,
- ❖ Merchant ships may be utilized for maritime crime,
- ❖ Limited capability for self-defense,
- ❖ Design/construction limitations make them vulnerable.

There is no doubt to remember when the sealines and shipping are the essential instruments of world trade chains. Furthermore, it could be a challenge with these questions, what is the importance of sealine and shipping? Moreover, why are they under threat? These are well known for; Properties of the Maritime industry, ability to transport high tonnage cargo and goods, accessibility to limited places rather than the other transport lines and instruments, and the most economical transportation type than the other combined transportation types.

All these circumstances show that many essential results like;

- ❖ Human and Environmental damages,
- ❖ Ships, Countries, and Companies damages,
- ❖ Cargoes and Good damages,
- ❖ The last and most crucial Trust and Authority damages.



Figure 4: Essential Results.

The maritime economy is highly vulnerable since the ships travel globally and need to be secured individually. When an incident occurs on the trade courses, the prices of goods get higher with a butterfly effect. The security of merchant shipping over the seas affects energy supply security; the energy supply security affects global economic order, The security of world coastlines adjacent to significant sea lanes necessitate the sustainment of maritime security, The scope and nature of environmental threats to national security and strategies to engage them are a subject of debate. While all environmental events are not considered significant or being categorised as threats, many transnational issues, both global and regional, would affect national security (Kimberley et.al., 2002: 60). Emerging issues such as proliferation, failing states, and global terrorism increasingly dominate the reality of the threat.

4.1. Measures against Maritime Threat

Maritime transportation and its associated facilities are appropriately organised, and planned government and international agencies/organisations are helping to establish the security of ships, ports, and shipping lines. Thus, it successfully takes precautions and deterrence against illegal activities such as piracy and maritime terrorism that prevent sea transportation and significantly reduce it. (Bueger, 2014: 406-416; Terzi et al., 2016; Çetin et.al., 2020: 365-367). It is envisaged that incident/accident-driven consequent management is in force in the maritime domain. Following some significant incidents or accidents faced by nations, some measures have been introduced into the maritime domain. Some of these measures are as follows:

- ❖ SOLAS 1974
- ❖ Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) (1988) (Supplementary Protocol, 2005)
- ❖ Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) (2001)
- ❖ Advance Cargo Declaration (ACD) (2002)
- ❖ Container Security Initiative (CSI) (2002)
- ❖ Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)(2003)
- ❖ International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) (2004)
- ❖ Best Management Practices – 4 (BMP 4) (2011-2018)
- ❖ Best Management Practices – 5 (BMP 5) (2018).

Table 1: Tyrpes of Threats at Sea (ATP-02, 2014)

The Air and Surface Threat (Details in Annex 4 B)
The Submarine (underwater) Threat (Details in Annex 4C)
Underwater sabotage at Anchorage (Details in Annex 4D)
The Mine Threat (Details in 4E)
The Threat from Nuclear Weapons (Details in Annex 4F)
The Threat from Chemical Weapons (Details in Annex 4G)
The Threat from Biological Weapons (Details in Annex 4H)
The Threat from Piracy (Details in Annex 4I)
The Threat from Terrorism (Details in Annex 4J)

4.2. Maritime Security Challenges

The spectrum of the maritime community's current challenges is enormous. The possible solution to these challenges is through establishing partnerships among regional countries. It is considered the means of overcoming the challenges faced by seamen and sailors at sea. All future projections about the maritime sector emphasize the continuing requirement for security structures and capabilities to enhance vigilance, deterrence, and dissuasion to cope with unpredictable and rapidly changing situations, reinforce national and cooperative defense arrangements and deal flexibly with the symptoms of a broad spectrum of potential crisis. As the indispensable medium for trade and access to areas of strategic interest, the sea remains vital to a nation's economic vitality and the ability to protect the country and its alignment. (UK, BMD, 2017) It will continue to provide critical access for all military assets, allowing a wide range of security and peace support activities and, when necessary, the means to assemble and apply decisive combat power at a time and place of political choice. Maritime forces will continue to influence in support of political objectives by exploiting the sea as a strategic medium in providing security for a nation and its partners, preserving international order at sea, and promoting national values and interests in the wider world. Safe maritime routes are essential to peace and prosperity in the region. The sea is the route for transit and trade of resources upon which our economies depend. The seas and the resources that move over them must be protected. Any prolonged interruption of maritime transportation networks would undermine industrial production and the government's ability to provide the basic welfare of the population. Increased perceived threats to Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) will require constant vigilance and reliable protection for essential infrastructure, ports and anchorages, and shipping cargoes. By bulk (particularly energy), most of the world's trade will continue to transit sea areas adjacent to unstable countries and through chokepoints such as the Suez and Panama Canals and the Straits of Hormuz, and the Malacca Straits. Conflicts in the Middle East and Gulf have shown the potential for interdiction by criminals, irregulars, and states to exploit the fragility of international markets and affect the economic vitality of developed states. Expeditionary operations undertaken by sea will follow the same routes and will need protection appropriate to the time, intensity, and location of possible risks and threats demand. Transnational threats are a risk to maritime security. It is necessary to unify our efforts to coordinate actions and exchange information without infringing upon national sovereignty to identify, monitor, and intercept all those transnational maritime threats in a way that is consistent with national and international legislation. We need to develop a common operational framework. Maritime Security Operations (MSO) are defined as those measures performed by the appropriate civilian or military authorities and multinational agencies to counter the threat and mitigate the risks of illegal or threatening activities in the maritime domain. So that they may be acted upon in order to enforce the law, protect citizens and safeguard national and international interests, developing these operations will focus on terrorism, proliferation, narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, piracy, and armed robbery, but might also include smuggling, the protection of national resources, energy security, the prevention of environmental impact

and safeguarding sovereignty. In defining these activities, it is to be understood that the lead in the majority of issues is not a military remit but that a successful strategy for an increasingly secure maritime domain lies in a coherent civilian and military partnership (Developing a European Interagency Strategy For Maritime Security Operation, a paper supported by the Chiefs of European Navies, 2006). A common inter-agency approach to MSO would better safeguard shared prosperity and security interests by protecting and supporting legitimate activities while countering current and emerging terrorist threats and hostile, illegal, or dangerous acts within the maritime domain. Ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce would also promote regional and contribute to global economic stability and protect maritime trade as the heart of the regional and global economy. The need to meet the threats of the global security environment necessitates a solid and enduring partnership between civilian and military authorities. Maritime trade is of fundamental strategic importance to nations; indeed, societies' welfare and economic wealth depend on the ability to trade, which depends on the freedom of navigation. The Alliance's capability for merchant shipping operations is Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) with its associated Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TIP) as detailed in ATP-02, Edition C Version 3 dated September 2015.

4.3. Scope and Aim of NCAGS

Shipping and maritime-related operations often affect global trade and all commercial logistics processes by sea. Therefore, commercial shipping influences or is involved in all of its maritime-related operations. NCAGs interface with commercial shipping to explain the operational leader's job description and support its mission. (NATO-ATP-02-1). According to manual, operation leadership is also being commander's job. At this stage, NCAGs perform essential tasks. Same time NCAGS helps the Commander; especially in the event of an operation or crisis; freedom of maneuver and gaining initiative, assistance in the decision-making process, guidance for the effective and efficient use of military structures in the crisis region, economic welfare of the nations to which the commercial elements are dependent and ensuring international trade stability, free movement of maritime trade in the area of operation (AOO), It contributes significantly to the formation and development of features such as military support operations so that maritime trade can feel safe. NCAGS operates through the full spectrum of operations from peacetime to crisis and is configured and coordinated with other disciplines as the situation demands. At the lowest level of operational intensity during peacetime, there will be a baseline NCAGS capability, and the functions will usually be confined to preparation, monitoring, and cooperation with shipping authorities. In times of tension, NCAGS will contribute to both the military and economic development of the Joint/Combined Campaign Plan and, therefore, NCAGS must be considered at an early stage in any operational planning. Specific merchant ships may warrant closer interaction because of their economic or military significance or the area they operate. Different NCAGS tactics, techniques, and procedures may be applied to such merchant ships.




Figure 5: NCAGS influence diagram (ATP-02, 2014)

According to the ATP-02 Ed.-C, Version-3 NCAGS may be instigated to maintain the integrity of specific trade routes and to safeguard the uninterrupted flow of vital strategic materials and energy and the trade on which prosperity relies. This activity requires regular exercise and drill to enhance coordination and provide a usable interface between military commanders and merchant vessel owners and operators to maximize the potential for effective deterrence and security. Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping is, by definition, the provision of cooperation, guidance, advice, and assistance to merchant shipping in support of the commander's mission and to enhance the safety and security of merchant ships (ATP-02, Edition C Version 3 dated September 2015). The purpose of NCAGS is to cooperate with merchant shipping in periods of crisis and conflict, including crisis response shipping and neutral shipping under charter to allied nations, to enhance their safety and deconflict shipping from military operations. The main task of NCAGS is to minimize interference between military operations and merchant ships' movements. Deconfliction should aim to keep merchant ships clear of military operations by persuading masters to comply with NCAGS guidance and recommendations. It should be done by identifying potential interference between military and merchant ships, such as separation zones, traffic lanes, fishing areas, chokepoints, main shipping routes, and so forth. It means that NCAGS is a decision-making process like most sea-going businesses or naval operations. The NCAGS's mission is to provide military commanders with the information necessary to provide Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA). The goal of MSA is to assist Homeland Defense by maintaining as much real-time information as possible regarding Merchant shipping, such as positions, destinations, cargo, etc. As a result, the NCAGS organization can provide national. Furthermore, allied merchant vessels the information needed to help prevent terrorist attacks at sea or in port.

4.4. Conduct of NCAGS Through the Spectrum of Operations

NCAGS operates through the full spectrum of operations from peacetime to crisis and is configured and coordinated with other disciplines as the situation demands. At the lowest level of operational intensity during peacetime, there will be a baseline NCAGS capability, and the functions will usually be confined to preparation, monitoring, and cooperation with shipping authorities. In times of tension, NCAGS will contribute to both the military and economic development of the Joint/Combined Campaign Plan and, therefore, NCAGS must be considered at an early stage in any operational planning. Specific merchant ships may warrant closer interaction because of their economic or military significance or the area they operate. Different NCAGS tactics, techniques, doctrines, and procedures may be applied to merchant ships. NCAGS also contributes personnel educated and trained to cooperate with commercial shipping, stakeholders, Academicians, Civil actors, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System (AWNIS), Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC), Transport Group on Ocean Shipping (TGOS), National Shipping Authority (NSA).



Figure 6: Attack Team has just boarded on ships Denizkurdu Exercise, 2015.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The primary purpose of Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping-NCAGS is to make use of both Naval and Civil Maritime Authorities, Maritime Agency and the Commercial Shipping Industry, Maritime Trade Companies in order to facilitate an uninterrupted flow of maritime commerce in periods of peace and conflict and simultaneously minimize disruption to military operation periods. Also, it is an excellent instrument that strengthens the security of mariners and all kind of ships in risky areas during voyages and shipping. The NCAGS benefits are not only security mariners and ships but also improved safety and security in the maritime area, minimized disruptions during passages on military exercise area, made shields to maritime terrorism, help the understanding of naval constraints for the maritime world. Besides these benefits are also helpful for All Nation Naval Forces due to able to right understand a more comprehensive picture of merchant ships' activities, deconfliction of merchant ship voyages, improve the effectiveness of military operations in all areas, the proper understanding of maritime commercial constraints, also can stop the current threat of piracy on risky areas. For Merchant, ships are being voluntary in the NCAGS system. It shows that bringing together military, public, civil and academic staff, and establishment constitutes working to improve maritime safety by the NCAGS.

REFERENCES

Andrés, M., Barragán, J.M., Sanabria, J.G., (2017). Relationships between coastal urbanization and ecosystems in Spain. *Cities*, 68, 8-9.

Allied Tactical Publication ATP 2 (B) Volume 1 (2014) NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING (NCAGS) – GUIDE TO OWNERS, OPERATORS, MASTERS, AND OFFICERS.

Allied Tactical Publication ATP 2 (B) Volume 2 (2016) NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING (NCAGS) – GUIDE TO OWNERS, OPERATORS, MASTERS, AND OFFICERS.

Bakir, N.O. (2007). A Brief Analysis Of Threats And Vulnerabilities In The Maritime Domain, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security,17-49.

BMP-4, (2011). Best Management Practices for Protection against Somali Based Piracy.

- Bueger, C. (2015). What is Maritime Security? *Marine Policy*, 53:159-164.
- BPM-5, (2018). Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea.
- Bueger, C. (2014). Piracy studies: academic responses to the return of an ancient menace. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 49(3), 406-416.
- Chalk, P. (2008), *The Maritime Dimension of International Security*, ABD.
- Çaycı, S. (2009) *The Struggle Against Piracy: The Somalia Case and Turkey's Position*, Center For Middle Eastern Strategic Studies the Public Research Foundation, 1, 9-12.
- Çetin, O., Köseoğlu, M.C., (2020). A Study on the Classification of Maritime Security Threat Topics, *International Journal of Environment and Geoinformatics (IJEGEO)*, 7(3): 365-371.
- Game Report, 2010, U.S. Naval War College.
- Greenberg, M.D., Chalk, P., Willis, H.H., Khilko, I., Ortiz, D.S., (2006). *Maritime Terrorism, Risky and Liability*, 10.
- Halberstam, M. (1988). Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, *The American Journal of International Law*, 82(2), 269-310.
- Klitzman S, Freudenberg N. (2003). Implications of the World Trade Center attack for the public health and health care infrastructures. *Am J Public Health*, 93(3):400-406.
- Kleiman, M. A. R. (2004). *Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat: Causal Links and Implications for Domestic Drug, Control Policy*, 2-7.
- Kimberley L. Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi, (2002). *Transnational Threats and Maritime Responses*, in *Globalization and Maritime Power*, ed. Sam J. Tangredi, National Defense Univ. Press: 60.
- Mersin, K., Bayırhan., İ, Gazioğlu, C. (2019). Review of CO2 emission and reducing methods in maritime transportation. **Thermal Science**, 23(6), 2073-2079.
- Murphy, M.N., (2007). Introduction, Contemporary Piracy, and Maritime Terrorism: The threat to international security, *The Adelphi Papers*, 47:7-10.
- Murphy, M.N., (2007). *SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM: A Suitable Role for a Navy?* *Naval War College Review*, 60(3): 22-45.
- Richardson, M. (2004). *Growing Vulnerability of Seaports from Terror Attacks*. Yale Global: Viewpoints.
- Rubin, A P., (1998) *The Law of Piracy*, Transnational, 126-127.
- Sixteenth OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum (28- 29 January 2008).- Part 1: "Maritime and inland waterways co-operation in the OSCE area: Increasing security and protecting the environment" Vienna.
- Terzi, H., Gazioğlu, C. (2016). *New Era In Maritime Safety: Safety Culture*, 13th International IALA VTS Symposium, the International framework for VTS and national regulatory provisions.

The VOA, www.voanews.com%2Fa%2Ffrica_sudan-agrees-compensate-families-us-sailors-killed-cole-bombing%2F6184184.html&psig=AOvVaw220GRxz6N9GWpXQjOn3x21&ust=1650254967300000&source=images&cd=vfe&ved=2ahUKEwjS_pf6nJr3AhUDtqQKHaCkAksQr4kDegQIARA6 Erişim Tarihi: 08.04.2022.

The Maritime Crprus, www.maritimecyprus.com/2016/10/29/flashback-in-history-terrorist-attack-on-uss-cole-on-12-october-2000/ Erişim Tarihi: 08.04.2022.

The Britannica, www.britannica.com/event/USS-Cole-attack Erişim Tarihi: 08.04.2022.

The IMO, <https://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Structure.aspx> Erişim Tarihi: 08.04.2022.

The United Kingdom, BMD, 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/649518/archive_doctrine_uk_maritime_jdp_0_10.pdf Erişim Tarihi: 08.04.2022.

Takvim Gazetesi, <https://www.takvim.com.tr/galeri/dunya/11-eylul-saldisi-nedir-tarihin-tum-akisini-degistiren-2001-olayi>. Erişim Tarihi: 08.04.2022.

The Israeled, 2022 <https://israeled.org/achille-lauro> Erişim Tarihi: 08.04.2022.

Xavier, N., (2004) No Terrorism Threat in Straits, Star On-Line.

Wurl, O., Ekau, W., Landing, W.M., Zappa, C.J., (2017). Sea surface microlayer in a changing ocean – A perspective. *Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene*, 5-31.